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CotmTS-VALIDITY OF CoNTRACTS RESTRICTING VENUE IN ACTIONS UNDER

FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LlABILITY Aar-Petitioner suffered injuries in the
course of his duties as an employee of respondent railroad. Subsequently, respondent advanced money to petitioner and the latter agreed in writing that if
his claim could not be settled he would sue only in the county or district where
he resided at the time of the injury, or in the county or district where the injury
was sustained. This agreement restricted petitioner's choice of venue to either a
state or federal court sitting in Michigan. Ignoring the contract, petitioner sued
in an Illinois court. Respondent then brought suit in the Michigan courts to
enjoin the lliinois proceeding and the injunction was granted.1 On certiorari,
held, reversed. The contract restricting venue was void since it confficted with
the provisions of sections 5 and 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act.2 Boyd
v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company, (U.S. 1949) 70 S.Ct. 26.
It is a general rule of contract law that agreements restricting choice of venue
or depriving particular courts of jurisdiction are void as against public policy.3
An exception to the general rule is where the agreement is made after the cause
of action has accrued. 4 The reason behind the exception is that once the cause
of action has accrued, it is immaterial whether a plaintiff selects his venue by
contract or simply by bringing suit. It being therefore generally recognized that
agreements similar to that in the principal case are valid so far as contract law
is concerned,!; the real issue is whether they contravene either the policy or the
express provisions of the FELA. In the past, both state and federal courts have
split almost evenly on this question, 6 and the principal case is significant because
it decides the controversy with finality. The express ground of the decision is
that such contracts conffict with the provisions of sections 5 and 6 of the Act.
THE

1

321 Mich. 693, 33 N.W. (2d) 120 (1948).
35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1946) §51 et seq.
3 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRAars, rev. ed., §1725 (1938), and cases there cited; CoNTRACTS
REsTATEMllNT, §558 (1932); 59 A.L.R. 1445 (1929); 107 A.L.R. 1060 (1937).
4 Note 3, supra.
5 That such agreements are valid under contract law is usually assumed without discus•
sion, but see the concurring opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 174 F. (2d) 556 at 560 (1949) in which he argues that they are invalid contracts, but
not because of §5 of the Liability Act. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred in the
principal case on the same grounds.
6 The conllicting decisions are cited in footnote 3 of the principal opinion. Holding these
contracts valid are Roland v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R. Co., (D.C. ID. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 630;
Herrington v. Thompson, (D.C. Mo. 1945) 61 F. Supp. 903; Clark v. Lowden, (D.C. Minn.
1942) 48 F. Supp. 261; Detwiler v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., (D.C. Minn. 1936) 15 F.
Supp. 541; and Detwiler v. Lowden, 198 Minn. 185, 269 N.W. 367 (1936). Cases holding
these contracts invalid are Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (2d Cir., 1949) 174 F. (2d) 556;
Akerly v. New York C.R. Co., (6th Cir., 1948) 168 F. (2d) 812; Fleming v. Husted, (D.C.
Iowa 1946) 68 F. Supp. 900; Sherman v. Pere Marquette R. Co., (D.C. ID. 1945) 62 F.
Supp. 590; Petersen v. Ogden U. R. & D. Co., 110 Utah 573, 175 P. (2d) 744 (1946).
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Section 6 gives a very wide choice of venue to plaintiffs.7 The apparent purpose
of Congress was to give injured workers every possible procedural advantage in
dealing with the carriers;8 and, as the Court puts it, these venue privileges of
employees have always been considered a "substantial right." Section 5 provides
that "any contract ... the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any
common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall
to that extent be void ... "9 and the Court in defining "any liability" includes
within it the venue provisions of section 6. Therefore, a contract designed to
protect the carrier from suit except in certain courts has the effect of exempting
the carrier from liability. The Court thus hinges the decision on the meaning of
"liability" as used in the act, and this is the point upon which most of the decisions of the lower federal courts and the state courts have turned. But if Congress
actually intended to include venue within liability it certainly did not express
this intent very clearly, as illustrated by the split of authority mentioned above.10
The case will certainly have to be distinguished if and when the possible future
contention is made that the liability of a defendant includes all of the procedural
rights of a plaintiff for all purposes. While such a distinction would not be difficult to make, it is submitted that there is an alternative ground for the decision
which is sound and does not require a strained and controversial construction of
the meaning of words. This alternative ground is implied in the last paragraph
of the opinion. "The right to select the forum granted 'in §6 is a substantial
right. It would thwart the express purpose of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act to sanction defeat of that right by the device at bar."11 The ~se of the term
"express purpose" rather than "express lan~age" indicates that the Court recognizes that there is present a question of policy as well as a question of statutory
interpretation. If the decision can be considered as resting on considerations of
policy rather than the strict lan~age of the statute, the case will not become a
troublesome precedent in construing the word "liability" when used in other
statutes.
John C. Walker, S.Ed.
7 45 U.S.C. §56 provides: " ... an action may be brought in a district court of the United
States, in the dist:rfct of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose,
or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with
that of the courts of the several States...."
s See the comment in 27 N.C. L. Rev. 248 (1949) which discusses the failure of the
various attempts by the railroads to limit venue under the FELA. Also Baltimore & 0. R. Co.
v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 6 (1941) and Miles v. Illinois C. R. Co., 315 U.S. 698,
62 S.Ct. 827 (1942), discuss the legislative purposes behind §6 of the act.
9 35 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. (1946) §55. Italics added.
10 It should be noted that when §5 was written in 1908 there were no special venue
provisions in the act, and the ''liability" referred to at that time must have meant the liability
created by §1. Section 6 was added by amendment in 1910.
11 Principal case at 28 (1949).

